Economic Growth and the Interests of
Future (and Past and Present) Generations:
A Comment on Tyler Cowen
Matthew D. Adler†
What principles vis-à-vis future generations should govern our policy choices? Tyler Cowen argues for a “Principle of Growth”: “We should
make political choices so as to maximize the rate of sustainable economic
1
growth.” Economic growth means the growth of inclusive gross domestic
product (GDP), not just marketed goods and services, but also leisure
2
time, household production, and environmental amenities.
Cowen, as I read him, suggests that the Principle of Growth is justified by a welfarist, consequentialist moral theory. The core of the argument is that increasing economic growth both increases average wellbeing in future generations, and increases the well-being of the worst off
3
in future generations (so there’s a distributive benefit as well). He
worries about the nonconsequentialist moral precepts of commonsense morality, and suggests that those might be handled through a
4
rights constraint, incorporated in a Modified Principle of Growth.
I find welfare consequentialism quite plausible, so for purposes of
this Response I will ignore rights and other nonconsequentialist constructs. I want instead to focus on a worry about the Principle of
Growth that arises within welfare consequentialism.
Welfare consequentialists say that the moral appropriateness of a
choice is determined by its possible outcomes, and that the goodness
of an outcome is determined solely by facts about individual welfare.
To put this in the language of normative economics, welfare consequentialism says to maximize a social welfare function whose argu5
ments are individual utilities, measuring each individual’s well-being.
† Leon Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Eric
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Before I explain why welfare consequentialists should worry
about Cowen’s Principle of Growth, let me make a few preliminary
points. First, it is important to see that Cowen is not making a Paretodominance argument in the style of Louis Kaplow and Dexter Samida
6
and David Weisbach. He is not claiming that a policy that increases
the growth rate can be coupled with intergenerational transfers so
that everyone in both current and future generations is better off.
Rather, the claim is that, even if a policy that increases the growth rate
makes some individuals in the current or near-term generations worse
off, it is a better policy. To put the point another way, the Principle of
Growth is offered as a way to choose between Pareto-noncomparable
allocations of well-being to different generations.
Second, Cowen suggests that the welfare-consequentialist social
planner should be time neutral. He should not give less weight to the
well-being of future individuals per se. Time neutrality, indeed, might
seem to be the hallmark of any recognizably moral theory about how
we should act vis-à-vis the future (as opposed to a predictive theory,
which postulates how the political process will in fact operate, or a
theory of individual rational choice, which might allow an individual
to discount his own, and certainly someone else’s, well-being). In fact,
I am not sure that neutrality regarding future interests is morally unchallengeable, for two reasons. One involves the problem of infinite
futures and infinite streams of well-being, which Geoffrey Heal dis7
cusses. A second involves “existence” or “nonidentity” problems. If
some present policy choice brings into existence a future individual—
who would not exist were a different choice to be selected—does her
8
well-being count in evaluating the goodness of that choice?
However, bracketing infinite welfare streams and existence problems, I think it is reasonably clear that welfare consequentialism
should be time neutral. Imagine that the universe has finite spatial
Matthew D. Adler and Chris W. Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U Pa L Rev 279, 291–96 (2006) (same).
6
See Dexter Samida and David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U
Chi L Rev 145, 155–60 (2007); Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U Chi L Rev 79, 86–87 (2007). Of course, Samida
and Weisbach and Kaplow advance a Pareto-dominance argument in favor of discounting, not in
favor of a principle of growth. But the more general point of their articles—I take it—is that, in
formulating principles for intergenerational policy, we should keep in mind the possibility that
some policy option coupled with a scheme of intergenerational wealth transfers might be Paretosuperior to another policy. Cowen, however, is not presenting this sort of argument for the Principle of Growth. See Cowen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 22 (cited in note 1) (“Pure Pareto improvements
are few and far between. So at some level of the analysis, through some method or another, we
must assert that the benefits to one group of people outweigh the losses to another.”).
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extent, will definitely end, and contains a finite number of individuals
whose identities are fixed relative to the choice at hand. In that case,
how could the welfare consequentialist justify giving less weight to the
interests of future individuals just by virtue of their temporal position? Note that a number of the standard arguments for discounting
pressed by economists do not invoke a pure time preference—a preference for present over future well-being. Rather, these arguments
point to opportunity costs; the proposition that future individuals will
be wealthier (hence have a lower marginal utility of money, so that
9
future dollars should be discounted); or uncertainty.
A third, and final, preliminary point. In his article, Cowen raises
the possible concern that increased GDP (even GDP defined in an
inclusive sense) might not mean increased well-being. What if having a
10
larger GDP does not make people happier? I am not that worried
about this issue. Well-being—as I have argued elsewhere—involves
11
the satisfaction of self-interested, fully informed preferences. The lists
of objective goods proposed by objectivists about well-being, such as
Martha Nussbaum’s list—life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses,
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other
12
species; play; control over one’s environment —are, in turn, plausibly
understood as estimates of what self-interested individuals with full
13
information would prefer. Happiness is one component of well-being,
14
but not the sole component. Whatever the connection between GDP
and happiness, it seems very plausible that there is a strong empirical
connection between a society’s overall GDP and its overall well-being

9
See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis
175–76 (Harvard 2006).
10 See Cowen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 23–27 (cited in note 1). Cowen ultimately concludes that
“wealth and happiness commove in the longer run.” Id at 24. But what matters to the welfarist is
the connection between wealth (GDP) and well-being, not wealth and happiness. My point, in
this paragraph, is that greater GDP plausibly correlates with greater overall well-being even if it
doesn’t correlate (or correlate as well) with greater overall happiness.
11 See Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 38–39 (cited in note
9). Strictly, Posner and I argue that well-being consists in the satisfaction of self-interested, idealized preferences, without taking a position in the debate between full-information accounts of
idealization and other accounts. I, in fact, find the full-information account particularly plausible.
In any event, my claim, here, that well-being encompasses more than happiness, and that GDP
correlates well with overall well-being regardless of its correlation with overall happiness, does
not depend on the specifics of preference idealization.
12 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach
78–80 (Cambridge 2000).
13 See, for example, Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 31–32,
51, 74–75 (cited in note 9); Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist
Theory of Regulation, 28 Fla St U L Rev 241, 297–99 (2000).
14 See Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 28–31, 50 (cited in
note 9).
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(or, equivalently, between its per capita GDP and the average well15
being of its members).
So why do I worry about the justifiability of Cowen’s Principle of
Growth within welfare consequentialism? The problem is this: the
contemporary philosophical literature points to four plausible variants
of welfare consequentialism, and it’s far from clear that all would underwrite the Principle of Growth. At a minimum, Cowen hasn’t done
the analytic work to demonstrate that they all would.
The four variants are:
1.

Utilitarianism. Utilitarians, of course, seek to maximize overall
well-being.

2.

Prioritarianism. The idea here is to give greater weight to changes
in well-being that affect individuals who are worse off. The effect
on the social calculus of a change in some individual’s well-being
is a function, not just of the size of the change, but also of the individual’s level of well-being. More technically, prioritarians do
not sum utilities (as do utilitarians) but sum an increasing concave function of each individual’s utility. (The sum of the square
root of each individual’s utility would be an example of a prioritarian social welfare function.) An equivalent definition is that
prioritarians maximize a social welfare function which is Paretian
and equity-regarding in the Pigou-Dalton sense and separable in
individual utilities. The limiting point of prioritarianism is the
16
leximin principle (defined on welfare, not primary goods).

3.

Comparativism. This maximizes a Paretian social welfare function
which is equity-regarding in the Pigou-Dalton sense but not sepa17
rable in individual utilities. The idea here (nontechnically) is
that the comparativist is interested in the pattern of welfare levels
while the prioritarian is not. Consider a policy that, with certainty,
increases person P’s welfare from fifty to fifty-eight, and de-

15 I say “empirical connection” because, even if GDP is defined inclusively to take account
of leisure time, household production, and environmental amenities, it is conceptually possible
for GDP and overall well-being to diverge. Nussbaum’s list, for example, includes items that
would not be subsumed by an inclusive GDP measure.
16 On prioritarianism, see Adler and Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty at 296–304
(cited in note 5); Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 56–58 (cited in
note 9). Leximin ranks two outcomes by comparing the welfare levels of the individuals who are
worst off in each outcome and picking the outcome where the worst-off individual’s welfare is
higher—or, if the worst-off individuals are equally well off, comparing the second-to-worst-off
individuals, then (if these are equal), the third-to-worst-off, and so on.
17 See Adler and Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty at 296–304 (cited in note 5).
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creases Q’s from thirty to twenty-seven, and affects no one else.
For the utilitarian and the prioritarian, this is all the information
we need to evaluate the policy. By contrast, comparativists need
more information. Comparativists evaluate policies by considering not merely welfare changes and the welfare levels of affected
individuals (those whose welfares change), but also the welfare
levels of unaffected individuals. For example, if the social welfare
function being maximized is the sum of rank-weighted utility—
one kind of comparativist function—the policy will increase social
welfare if there is one other individual in the population and she
is worse off than P and Q, but not if her well-being level is in be18
tween P’s and Q’s.
4.

Sufficientism. The idea here is to give greater weight, or perhaps
absolute priority, to welfare changes that affect individuals below
some well-being threshold—call it the poverty line, or the line of
19
basic functioning.

Utilitarianism corresponds to a specific social welfare function:
the unweighted sum of utilities. By contrast, prioritarianism, comparativism, and sufficientism each correspond to a distinct family of social
20
welfare functions —each to a different, generic departure from the
simple utilitarian formula of maximizing overall well-being.
It is pretty straightforward to see that prioritarian, comparativist,
and sufficientist social welfare functions need not endorse a policy that
maximizes economic growth. Consider a very simple example, which
involves a finite, fixed population—meaning that the total number of
individuals across time is the same finite amount regardless of which
policy is picked—and no problems of intragenerational equity or uncertainty. There are two generations, with F individuals in the first
generation and S in the second. S > F; the size of the living population
18 Imagine that the third individual, M, has utility level m in both cases. If M is worse off
than both P and Q (in both outcomes), the rank-weighted sum of utilities in the status quo
equals (3 × m) + (2 × 30) + (1 × 50), and the rank-weighed sum of utilities with the policy equals
(3 × m) + (2 × 27) + (1 × 58). In this case, the policy is better. By contrast, if M is in between P
and Q (in both outcomes), then the rank-weighted sum of utilities in the status quo equals
(3 × 30) + (2 × m) + (1 × 50), and the rank-weighted sum of utilities with the policy is (3 × 27) +
(2 × m) + (1 × 58). In this case, the status quo is better.
19 For a defense of sufficientism, see generally Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 Ethics 745 (2003).
20 More precisely, each corresponds to a family of social welfare orderings. An ordering is a
ranking of outcomes. Some orderings cannot be represented by functions (where a function is a
mapping from each outcome to a number that represents the place of the outcome in the ordering). For example, a leximin ordering of an uncountably infinite set of outcomes cannot be represented by a function. However, since the term “social welfare function” is more familiar than
“social welfare ordering,” I use the former term in the text.
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is growing over time. The status quo is zero economic growth. Everyone in the first generation is at utility level ten, and everyone in the
second generation is at level ten. There’s a policy that produces economic growth—at some cost. (Because the Principle of Growth is
meant to adjudicate between Pareto-noncomparable outcomes, it will,
inter alia, approve some policies that purchase growth at some cost to
the current generation.) Let us assume that we can trade a small decrease in per capita GDP and average well-being in the first generation for a substantially larger increase in per capita GDP and average
well-being in the second generation. In particular, let us assume that
the growth policy reduces the well-being of each first-generation individual to nine, and increases the well-being of each second-generation
individual to fifteen.
What will our different social welfare functions say about the policy?
The utilitarian will approve the policy. Total well-being in the
status quo is 10F + 10S. Total well-being with the growth policy is 9F +
15S. Because S > F, the policy increases overall well-being.
The prioritarian may not approve the growth policy. To begin, regardless of the size of F and S, a leximin social welfare function will
certainly not approve the growth policy. In the status quo, the worstoff person is at level ten. With growth, the worst-off person (namely,
everyone in the first generation) is at level nine. What about less extreme versions of prioritarianism—those that sum an increasing concave function of individual utilities and therefore (by contrast with
leximin) allow a sufficiently small loss to the welfare of the worst-off
individual to be compensated by a sufficiently large gain for individuals who are better off? Formally, SW(O) = ȈW(Ui), where SW is the
social welfare function, Ui is the utility of individual i, and W is an increasing concave function. The social value of the status quo equals
(F × W(10)) + (S × W(10)). The social value of the policy equals
23
(F × W(9)) + (S × W(15)). Which is larger depends on the shape of W.

21 Talk of “population change” is ambiguous. In the example at hand, the population is
temporally variable (the number of individuals in each generation is not the same) but modally
fixed. The number of individuals at each time, and thus throughout time, is the same in each
possible world—whether the policy or status quo is chosen. It is modal, not temporal, variation in
population that leads to puzzles for welfarists—the existence/nonidentity puzzles.
22 The growth metric used in this example is the growth of average well-being from generation to generation. In principle, as mentioned in note 15, average well-being and GDP per
capita might diverge, but I’m ignoring that possibility here.
23 Consider the family of functions W(U ) = −1 × (U )N, where N < 0. These functions have
i
i
positive first derivatives and negative second derivatives, so are increasing and concave. If N is
sufficiently close to zero, the growth policy is better than the status quo. But if N is sufficiently
far from zero, the status quo is better than the growth policy. Consider, for concreteness, the case
where there are twice the number of individuals in the second generation as in the first: S = 2F.
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The comparativist may not approve the growth policy. To be sure,
the growth policy increases total well-being, which grows from 10F +
10S to 9F + 15S. On the other hand, the policy increases the inequality
in welfare levels in the intertemporal population—that is the entire
population of F + S individuals taken as a group. In the status quo, there
is no gap at all in welfare levels. Everyone in both generations is at level
ten. With the policy, the gap becomes six. The better-off individuals
(namely everyone in the second generation) are at level fifteen; the
worse-off individuals (namely everyone in the first generation) are at
level nine. The distribution of utilities with the growth policy, (9, 9, 9,
. . . , 15, 15, 15, . . . ), is certainly a less equal distribution than the distribution of utilities in the status quo, (10, 10, 10, . . . , 10, 10, 10, . . . ), and
the comparativist might judge that it is worse, all things considered,
notwithstanding the increase in total well-being.
Finally, the sufficientist may not approve the growth policy. Let us
imagine that the threshold, for purposes of the sufficientist theory, is
just at level ten. Then the growth policy increases overall well-being
but also increases the number of individuals below the threshold, from
zero to F. Depending on how the sufficientist trades off belowthreshold and above-threshold utility, she may or may not approve the
growth policy. Alternatively, imagine that the sufficientist threshold is
five. In this case, the sufficientist will approve the growth policy, because it increases overall well-being and the number of below24
threshold individuals is zero both with growth and in the status quo.
The lesson of this example, I suggest, is that the justifiability of
Cowen’s Principle of Growth remains open to question within welfare
consequentialism, and more generally that the rejection of nonconsequentialism and nonwelfarism hardly settles questions of social policy
vis-à-vis future generations. Even with welfare consequentialism in
hand, we still need to do the hard, philosophical work of figuring out
which specific social welfare function policymakers should use. And, if
the specification of a social welfare function is seen as an irreducibly
subjective matter, appropriate for legislatures rather than scholars, we
will need to refer the issue to the political process and await its answer
before recommending intergenerational policies. Except in the limit-

In this case, if for example N = −5, the growth policy is better. But if, for example, N = −12, the
status quo is better.
24 The standard version of sufficientism stipulates that above-threshold individuals do not
have egalitarian claims vis-à-vis each other. See Crisp, 113 Ethics at 755 (cited in note 19) (“[W]hen
people reach a certain level, even if they are worse off than others, benefiting them does not, in
itself, matter more.”). So, in the limiting case where the number of below-threshold individuals is
zero regardless of the policy chosen, sufficientism reduces to utilitarianism.
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25

ing case where a policy is genuinely Pareto superior and debates between utilitarians, prioritarians, comparativists, and sufficientists can
be ignored, welfarist intergenerational policymaking depends on the
shape of the social welfare function.
This claim does not depend on the unrealistic simplicity of the
example I have been discussing. The example was chosen to illustrate
the claim in an accessible and direct way. But it is hard to see why it
would not be the case that, in more complicated and realistic cases, the
optimal intertemporal policy choice, given welfare consequentialism,
will depend on the shape of the social welfare function.
A second point illustrated by the example is that the welfare consequentialist (at least bracketing nonidentity problems and problems
of infinite populations) should apply her social welfare function to the
world’s total intertemporal population, consisting of everyone in the
first generation plus everyone in the second generation all the way
through to everyone in the last generation—without reference to the
identities of the individuals, other nonwelfare information, or their
position in time. That is, after all, just what welfarism plus timeneutrality means—or at least how it is most naturally expressed. If
there are F individuals in the first generation, S in the second generation and T in the third and last generation, and policymakers at any
point in time are considering policies, then each possible policy corresponds to a vector of utilities with F + S + T entries, one for each individual who exists at some time, whether in the past, the present, or the
26
future. Policies are chosen by applying the preferred social welfare
function—utilitarian, prioritarian, comparativist, or sufficientist—to
these utility vectors. And the social welfare function must be anonymous, meaning that reorderings of the same set of numbers must be
27
ranked the same. That is, (1, 1, 5, 5, 7, 7) must be ranked the same as
(5, 1, 7, 5, 7, 1), and so forth. The crucial point about this formalism is
that the only information about a given individual that influences the

25 Meaning that some individuals in some generations are better off and no one is worse
off. Although it is possible to marry welfarism and non-Paretianism, the arguments for the
Pareto principle are very strong and I therefore assume that any plausible social welfare function
will approve a Pareto-superior outcome. See Adler and Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty at
293–94 (cited in note 5).
26 This ignores uncertainty, and assumes that each policy corresponds to a particular outcome—a particular vector of utilities with F + S + T entries. Given uncertainty, each policy corresponds to a set of possible outcomes—to a set of possible utility vectors, each with F + S + T
entries. See id at 304–09.
27 On “anonymous” or, equivalently, “symmetric” social welfare functions, see id at 294.
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social welfare function is his well-being. His name, other nonwelfare
28
information, and his position in time are all washed out.
This welfarist and temporally neutral way of conceptualizing policy choice undermines Cowen’s suggestion that nonutilitarians should
approve the Principle of Growth because greater growth makes poor
individuals in the future better off than they would be with less
29
growth. Even if that is true, the issue for the nonutilitarian, given
time neutrality, is the distribution of welfare levels throughout time,
not merely the distribution in the future. For example, if the policymaker employs a leximin function, she should lump all the generations
together, identify the individual who is worst off in that combined
population given each policy, and choose the policy that maximizes
that individual’s welfare level. If the policymaker’s view is comparativist, then she should lump all the generations together and consider the
pattern of utilities in that combined population associated with each
policy. Increased economic growth can improve the position of badlyoff individuals in future generations, but increased growth can also
reduce the position of badly-off individuals right now; it can increase
the gap between our welfare and the welfare of future generations;
and it may in principle increase, rather than decrease, the extent to
which people fall below “sufficientist” thresholds, depending on where
those are set.

28 It might be objected that nonutilitarians would care about the social position of individuals. Individuals in the same society have stronger redistributive claims on each other than on
individuals in a different society—or so it might be thought. But that view amounts to a kind of
nonwelfarism, and in any event doesn’t argue for taking each generation as a unit (since members of different generations can be part of the same society, and members of the same generation can be part of different societies), or for other sorts of departures from time-neutrality.
29 See Cowen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 21 (cited in note 1).

